🇩🇪 Deutsche Version: Gamet (Keimzelle)

A gamete is a haploid reproductive cell that fuses at fertilization with a gamete of the opposite sex to form the diploid zygote. In humans it carries 23 chromosomes.

Ontological classification

  • is subclass of: germline cell, hence part of the germline
  • is haploid
  • has subclass: oocyte and spermatozoon
  • is not a human person — and this statement is here correct and intended

Why “not a person” holds here

Personhood begins with fertilization. A germ cell is a part of an organism, not an organism; it has no developmental direction of its own toward an individual but is exhausted in fusing with another. From the active potency of an embryo personhood follows; from a gamete’s readiness to fuse it does not.

This demarcation is sharp and uncontested. Precisely for that reason it also has consequences when extended without care.

The limit of the demarcation

Newer procedures produce intermediate states that have neither arisen through fertilization nor emerged from the germline. In mitomeiosis neither of the two customary criteria applies to two successive states — and yet they are to be treated differently.

The state before the forced reductional division is diploid and materially the same construction as in cloning; what becomes of it is decided only by the next technical step. Simply classifying it as a gamete would be convenient — and would be not a finding but a decision: it would tacitly deny the question of personal status without that denial being stated anywhere. Here the status is to be kept open and the principle in dubio pro persona followed — just as is done with the synthetic embryo model.

The state after reduction stands otherwise. It is haploid and has no developmental direction other than fusion — and thus satisfies precisely the determination by which this article distinguishes the gamete from the embryo. That it is no gamete in the ordinary sense, lacking germline origin and recombination, makes it a poor gamete, not a candidate for personhood. Here the assignment of kind remains open without the question of personhood being touched; the tutioristic principle does not apply (further under Ontologically Uncertain Status).

See also

Sources: Generated by querying the Personhood ontology. Research as of 27 July 2026.